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INTRODUCTION
Members of the Advisory Committee on the Rules of Civil Procedure have
long worked to address complaints that discovery is too costly, and that cases
take too long to resolve.1 Four decades of rulemaking action have targeted
these issues and have resulted in the amendment of the civil procedure rules,
particularly the discovery rules, more often than any other body of procedural
law.2 Still, complaints continue to be mounted.3 The Committee’s recent proposed changes to the discovery rules are the latest attempt to address the perceived problem of cost and delay.4 The proposals have been controversial. Over
two thousand comments were submitted to the Committee, and some comments
divided along the lines of plaintiffs’ lawyers disfavoring the proposed rules and
defense lawyers favoring them.5 Given the considerable debate over the proposed amendments, the question becomes under what circumstances should advisory committees propose and adopt rule amendments.
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of the Northeastern University School of Law Symposium honoring Professor Steve Subrin.
Thanks also for comments from Brooke Coleman, Emory Lee, and Jeff Stempel. Special
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1
JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMM. ON CIVIL RULES & COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE
& PROCEDURE, REPORT TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE OF THE UNITED STATES ON THE 2010
CONFERENCE ON CIVIL LITIGATION 1 (2010) [hereinafter REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/reporttothechiefjusticepdf/.
2
Id. (“the Civil Rules, particularly the discovery rules, have been amended more frequently
than any others.”); see Danya Shocair Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice
Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. L. REV. 1085, 1103 (2012).
3
See REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1.
4
Memorandum from Hon. David G. Campbell, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of
Civil Procedure, to Hon. Jeffrey S. Sutton, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 4 (May 8, 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/14696/ [hereinafter
May 2013 Advisory Committee Report].
5
Tony Mauro, Lawyers Spar over Discovery Rules: Litigation Costs at Center of Debate,
NAT’L L.J., Feb. 24, 2014, at 1; Rebecca L. Shult, 2,000+ Public Comments Submitted
Responding to Proposed Changes to FRCP, LEXOLOGY (Apr. 21, 2014),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dd0982a2-7c5a-4001-8380-648939119c8a.
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Commentators have criticized the rulemaking process for decades. Legal
scholarship in the area has focused primarily on challenging its constitutionality,6 questioning whether different actors may make better rulemakers,7 and arguing that some entities have too much power and others have too little.8 Other
commentators have focused on the tools that should be employed by rulemakers when evaluating proposals, focusing on the importance of empirical studies
to support rule changes9 and the role of bias in the formulation of certain
rules.10
In this symposium article, we add to this scholarship by arguing that advisory committees should refrain from proposing and adopting rule amendments
that are motivated by atypical cases. Such rules will also affect typical cases,
creating bad law for typical cases because the rules were not formulated for
such cases.
Part I discusses the committee rulemaking procedure, previous attempts to
modify the scope of discovery with particular emphasis on the 2000 discovery
amendments, and creation of the current proposals. Part II describes the thesis
of a previous article on how atypical cases make bad law11 and applies the
framework to one of the current amendments, showing that atypical cases make
bad rules. Part III offers our brief recommendations on how rulemakers can
avoid atypical rule amendments.

6

See, e.g., Martin H. Redish & Uma M. Amuluru, The Supreme Court, the Rules Enabling
Act, and the Politicization of the Federal Rules: Constitutional and Statutory Implications,
90 MINN. L. REV. 1303 (2006). But see Robert G. Bone, The Process of Making Process:
Court Rulemaking, Democratic Legitimacy, and Procedural Efficacy, 87 GEO. L.J. 887
(1999) (defending court-based rulemaking as central to developing and maintaining rules
that reflect principled deliberation).
7
See, e.g., Brooke D. Coleman, Recovering Access: Rethinking the Structure of Federal
Civil Rulemaking, 39 N.M. L. REV. 261, 293–96 (2009); Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm,
Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation
Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 754–59 (1993). But see Bone, supra note 6 (arguing for a
“centralized, court-based, and committee-centered” system); Jack H. Friedenthal, The Rulemaking Power of the Supreme Court: A Contemporary Crisis, 27 STAN. L. REV. 673 (1975)
(arguing that the “legislative process seems particularly unsuited” to rulemaking).
8
See, e.g., Friedenthal, supra note 7; Laurens Walker, A Comprehensive Reform for Federal
Civil Rulemaking, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1993); Jack B. Weinstein, Reform of Federal
Court Rulemaking Procedures, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 905 (1976).
9
See, e.g., Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393
(1994); Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive Discovery Abuse: The Sequel,
39 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998) [hereinafter Mullenix, The Sequel]; Reda, supra note 2; Will
Rhee, Evidence-Based Federal Civil Rulemaking: A New Contemporaneous Case Coding
Rule, 33 PACE L. REV. 60 (2013).
10
See, e.g., Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors
of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529 (2001).
11
See Suja A. Thomas, How Atypical, Hard Cases Make Bad Law (See, e.g., The Lack of
Judicial Restraint in Wal-Mart, Twombly, and Ricci), 48 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 989 (2013).
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DISCOVERY RULEMAKING

A. An Overview of the Committee Rulemaking Process
The authority for the present committee rulemaking procedure stems from
the Rules Enabling Act (“REA”) which authorizes the Supreme Court to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases”
in district and appellate level federal courts.12 Congress delegated the bulk of
the rulemaking process between three lower entities: The Judicial Conference
of the United States (the “Conference”), the Standing Committee, and Advisory
Committees.13 The Conference is tasked with oversight of the rulemaking process and must “prescribe and publish the procedures for the consideration of
proposed rules” under the REA.14 To facilitate this task, the Conference may
appoint advisory committees consisting of “members of the bench and the professional bar, and trial and appellate judges”15 to recommend rules to be prescribed.16 Additionally, the Conference must appoint a “standing committee on
rules of practice, procedure, and evidence”17 to oversee the coordination and
suggestions of the various advisory committees.
The steps in the rulemaking process involve largely linear interactions between these three entities, the Supreme Court, and Congress in a hierarchical
structure.18 It is a time-consuming procedure requiring several years to complete.19 It begins when a rule suggestion by a judge, lawyer, professor, or other
individual or body is considered by the relevant advisory committee.20 If the
advisory committee is in favor of the change, it must draft and submit a proposed amendment, including an explanatory note and a written report explain12
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012). See generally Paul J. Stancil, Close Enough for Government
Work: The Committee Rulemaking Game, 96 VA. L. REV. 69 (2010) (providing an overview
of the rulemaking process); Procedures Governing the Rulemaking Process, U.S. COURTS,
http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAndPolicies/rules/about-rulemaking/laws-procedures-gov
erning-work-rules/rules-committee-procedures.aspx (revised Sept. 2011) (summarizing the
rulemaking process).
13
28 U.S.C. § 2073.
14
Id. § 2073(a)(1).
15
Id. § 2073(a)(2).
16
Id. There are currently five advisory committees, each focusing on a specific procedural
area: appellate, bankruptcy, civil, criminal, and evidence rules. John D. Bates, Overview for
the Bench, Bar, and Public, U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/RulesAnd
Policies/rules/about-rulemaking/how-rulemaking-process-works/overview-bench-barpublic.aspx (last visited Apr. 2, 2015).
17
28 U.S.C. § 2073(b).
18
Id. §§ 2073–2075.
19
The time to complete the rulemaking process may vary based on the nature of the proposed rule, the advisory committee involved, and the strength and number of affected individuals and groups. Commentator estimates of the usual length of time required to complete
the rulemaking process have ranged from two to five years. Bates, supra note 16 (“it usually
takes two to three years for a suggestion to be enacted as a rule”); Rhee, supra note 9, at 145
(estimating the usual rulemaking process to take between three and five years).
20
Bates, supra note 16.
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ing its action, to the standing committee.21 Upon approval, the proposed rule is
published for a period of public comment, normally six months.22 After the
public comments are collected and considered, the advisory committee may resubmit the proposal for public comment if significant changes are made to the
proposal, or submit a final form of the proposed rule to the Standing Committee
for approval.23 If the Standing Committee approves the proposed rule, the Conference considers it and may recommend it to the Supreme Court.24 Upon Supreme Court approval, it must be sent to Congress by May 1 in order to take
effect that year.25 Upon Congress’s approval or inaction, the rule is enacted in
December.26
At each step of the process, higher level entities may reject, modify, or recommit the proposal to a lower level entity for additional consideration.27 In
practice, these actions occur less frequently as proposals move to higher entities
in the rulemaking hierarchy, with revisionary action most likely to occur as
proposals move between the standing and advisory committees.28 Also Congressional rejection or modification of a proposed rule has occurred only on rare occasions since the inception of the modern rulemaking procedure.29
Commentators have concluded that lower level advisory committees “often
dictate the outcome of the [rulemaking] process”30 and enjoy “near absolute
discretion.”31 Because the advisory committee members are the most active and
perhaps most influential in the rulemaking process, this paper focuses on the
actions of the advisory committee.
B. Early Attempts to Reform the Scope of Discovery
Discovery reform efforts began in earnest at Chief Justice Burger’s 1976
National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice (the “Pound Conference”).32 Given the liberal understanding
of the discovery rules at the time, the Advisory Committee was hesitant to dramatically narrow the scope of discovery despite considerable pressure from the
21

28 U.S.C. § 2073(d).
Bates, supra note 16.
23
Id.
24
28 U.S.C. §§ 2072–2074.
25
Id. § 2074(a).
26
Id.
27
Stancil, supra note 12, at 78.
28
See id.; Walker, supra note 8, at 468 (“The Standing Committee has modified Advisory
Committee action on only a handful of occasions, and the Judicial Conference itself has taken even less action.” (footnote omitted)); see also Friedenthal, supra note 7, at 676 (criticizing the passive nature of the Supreme Court in rulemaking activity).
29
See Stancil, supra note 12, at 78.
30
Id., at 72–73.
31
Walker, supra note 8, at 463.
32
Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 765–66 (2010); Stempel, supra note 10, at 543.
22
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Chief Justice.33 One of the most influential proposals to narrow Rule 26 in the
wake of the Pound Conference was a 1977 report by the American Bar Association (“ABA”) Section on Litigation recommending the then-existing “relevant
to the subject matter” discovery standard of Rule 26(b)(1) be narrowed to a
“relevant to the claims and defenses of the parties” standard.34 This proposal
was supported by the American College of Trial Lawyers (“ACTL”).35 The
Advisory Committee initially adopted the recommendations of the ABA and
published the proposal for public comment but ultimately withdrew the proposal in light of significant opposition.36
Over the next twenty years, amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1983 and 1993 to reduce cost and delay, but the Advisory Committee continued to reject the ABA’s 1977 recommendation.37 In
1996 the Advisory Committee again began to investigate whether the scope of
discovery should be narrowed.38 The Committee appointed a discovery subcommittee to determine, among other things, the cost of discovery generally
and in the most expensive cases, and whether those costs were excessive
enough to warrant changes.39 The subcommittee solicited help from the Federal
Judicial Center (“FJC”) and RAND Corporation to investigate the discovery
process in federal litigation and held two conferences in 1997 to solicit judicial,
practitioner, and academic opinion on the discovery process.40
In its initial report to the Advisory Committee that summarized the findings of one of the conferences, the subcommittee noted that discovery was
working well in most cases.41 In discussing potential “core” discovery rule
amendments, the Advisory Committee noted:
The reality of discovery practice is not what might seem from talking with lawyers who pursue high-stakes and complex litigation in the major metropolitan
centers. The reality is the small and medium case. In these cases, every study
and much experience suggests that discovery is working well. And it seems like33

Stempel, supra note 10, at 543–44.
Id., at 544.
35
Id. at 557–58.
36
Id. at 544.
37
Henry S. Noyes, Good Cause Is Bad Medicine for the New E-Discovery Rules, 21 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 49, 54 (2007); Stempel, supra note 10, at 544–49.
38
Amelia F. Burroughs, Comment, Mythed It Again: The Myth of Discovery Abuse and
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 75, 84 (2001).
39
Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee (Oct. 6–7, 1997), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/17737/ [hereinafter Advisory Committee Minutes (October
1997)].
40
Stempel, supra note 10, at 555.
41
Advisory Committee Minutes (October 1997), supra note 39; Minutes, Civil Rules Advisory Committee (Nov. 12–13, 1997), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15145/ [hereinafter Advisory Committee Minutes (November 1998)] (“The FJC data proved very interesting. The data, in line with earlier studies, show that discovery is not used at all in a
substantial fraction of federal civil actions, and that in more than 80% of federal civil actions
discovery is not perceived to be a problem.”).
34
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ly that there is nothing the formal rules can do about the cases that now present
problems. The rules provide ample power to control discovery; what is needed is
actual use of the power.42

In light of this information, the Committee expressed interest in exploring
solutions to address problem cases without affecting the well-functioning typical cases.43 Despite sentiment toward a narrow reform approach at this initial
meeting, the Committee ultimately proposed a broad rule, which would affect
all cases, adopting the 1977 scope amendment that the ABA had proposed,
again also supported by the ACTL.44 In describing the proposal, the Committee
noted that the full range of discovery would be available in all cases upon court
determination or party agreement, but the Committee was careful to explain
that the proposal “makes it clear that there is a reduction in the scope of discovery available as a matter of right.”45 Despite considerable criticism, the proposal was approved in 2000.46
Disapproval of the new rule continued after its adoption. Scholars noted
that the rule was not supported by empirical evidence,47 that it was designed by
the legal elite, particularly corporate defense interests,48 that the rule would
generate greater uncertainty for practicing attorneys and judges,49 and that the
rule would result in a dramatic increase in purely procedural motion challenges
and posturing,50 or be completely ignored by the courts.51 In the years since its
passage, many have been dissatisfied with its effectiveness, including some
who were initially supportive of the change. Critics have noted that judges and
attorneys largely have ignored the rule, rendering it “toothless.”52

42

Advisory Committee Minutes (October 1997), supra note 39, at 8.
Id. (“[T]here is no intention to affect discovery as it is practiced in most cases. All of the
proposed limits on lawyer-managed discovery would permit discovery without judicial involvement at levels that include the vast majority of cases under actual present practice.”).
44
Stempel, supra note 10, at 556–59; Carl Tobias, Discovery Reform Redux, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 1433, 1440 (1999) (“[T]he proposed measure would apply to all lawsuits, even though
the recent FJC and RAND studies indicate that overbroad discovery principally occurs in a
rather small number of complicated cases.”).
45
Advisory Committee Minutes (November 1998), supra note 41.
46
Stempel, supra note 10, at 530–31.
47
See, e.g., Mullenix, The Sequel, supra note 9.
48
See, e.g., Stempel, supra note 10.
49
See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 44.
50
See, e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., A Square Peg in A Round Hole? The 2000 Limitation on
the Scope of Federal Civil Discovery, 69 TENN. L. REV. 13, 14 (2001).
51
See, e.g., Noyes, supra note 37, at 61.
52
Id. at 63; see also Ronald J. Hedges, A View from the Bench and the Trenches: A Critical
Appraisal of Some Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 227
F.R.D. 123, 126 (2005); John H. Beisner, Discovering A Better Way: The Need for Effective
Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 578 (2010) (describing a lack of clarity regarding
the pre- and post-amendment discovery standards); Christopher C. Frost, The Sound and the
Fury or the Sound of Silence?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1039, 1062 (2003) (describing an “ingrained
mindset of liberal discovery” among the bar and bench).
43
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C. Proposed Change to Discovery Rule 26(b)(1)
In light of continued criticism of discovery practice, calls to narrow the
scope of discovery persisted.53 An April 2008 study regarding discovery that
surveyed members of the ACTL especially caught the attention of rulemakers.
The ACTL and the Institute for the Advancement of the American Legal System (“IAALS”), which jointly conducted the study, concluded that “the system
is not working; it takes too long and costs too much. . . . Discovery costs far too
much and has become an end in itself.”54 In response to these concerns, the
Standing Committee asked the Advisory Committee to hold a conference on
the issues of cost and delay in the federal system.55 The Advisory Committee
began the process of soliciting information about discovery costs from interested parties and requested a study from the FJC to focus on the costs of discovery
generally and electronic discovery specifically under the rules.56 The 2010
Conference on Civil Litigation (the “Duke Conference”) resulted from those
planning efforts.
Impressionistic57 survey data presented at the Duke Conference reflected
the general sentiment that litigation was too costly and took too long. A National Employment Lawyers Association survey of member attorneys, an
IAALS survey of corporate general counsel, a survey given to members of the
ABA Section of Litigation, and the final version of the ACTL-IAALS survey
all found that respondent attorneys believed that the discovery process was too
costly, took too long, and was unfair.58 A survey of Fortune 200 companies
53
Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 767 (“After further rule amendments in 2000 and 2006,
the complaints are louder than ever.”).
54
AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS.,
INTERIM REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK
FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL
SYSTEM 3 (2008) [hereinafter ACTL & IAALS, INTERIM REPORT], available at
http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?Template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=
3650.
55
John G. Koeltl, Progress in the Spirit of Rule 1, 60 DUKE L.J. 537, 537 (2010).
56
EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., PRELIMINARY REPORT TO
THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES 5 (2009) [hereinafter FJC
REPORT],
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/dissurv1.pdf/$file
/dissurv1.pdf; Reda, supra note 2 at 1091 n.17.
57
Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 775; Reda, supra note 2, at 1100 (“The bulk of what
the Duke Conference labeled ‘empirical data’ consisted of opinion surveys that reflected the
concerns and beliefs among legal professionals.” (footnote omitted)).
58
REBECCA M. HAMBURG & MATTHEW C. KOSKI, NAT’L EMP’T LAWYERS ASS’N, SUMMARY
OF RESULTS OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER SURVEY OF NELA MEMBERS, FALL 2009,
at 11 (2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/natl-employment-law
yers-assoc-survey-nela-members-2009 (“Nearly 65% of NELA respondents find that existing discovery mechanisms do not work well, and approximately two-thirds believe that discovery is abused in almost every case.”); INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL
SYS., CIVIL LITIGATION SURVEY OF CHIEF LEGAL OFFICERS AND GENERAL COUNSEL
BELONGING TO THE ASSOCIATION OF CORPORATE COUNSEL 17 (2010), available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/institute-advancement-amer-legal-system-civ
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conducted by the Lawyers for Civil Justice (“LCJ”) also found that outside legal fees and costs had increased from an average of $66 million to $140 million
between 2000 and 2008 for the respondent companies.59 Several reports since
the Duke Conference further supported the general sentiment among attorneys
that litigation and discovery in particular were too expensive.60
Although these surveys told a story, they did not tell the full story. The
surveys were based on lawyers’ perceptions, not on real data, while the FJC
based its study on actual cases. The FJC solicited information from more than
two thousand attorneys of record about the litigation costs in federal civil cases
that were terminated in the last quarter of 2008.61 The FJC included cases that
lasted more than four years and also every tried case to “insure the inclusion of
cases likely to encounter the range of litigation issues.”62 In cases in which one
or more types of discovery were reported, the median litigation costs (including
attorneys’ fees) were $15,000 for plaintiffs and $20,000 for defendants.63 The
reported costs for plaintiffs ranged between $1,600 at the tenth percentile and
$280,000 at the ninety-fifth percentile; defendant costs ranged from $5,000 to
$300,000 at the same percentiles.64 Additionally, respondents were asked to report the ratio of discovery costs to the total costs of litigation for the closed
cases. The median percentage was 20 percent for plaintiffs’ attorneys and 27
percent for defendants’ attorneys.65 At the ninety-fifth percentile, the reported
percentage of litigation costs incurred in discovery was 80 percent for plaintiff
and defendant attorneys.66 As noted by Emery Lee and Thomas Willging, authors of the FJC study:
il-litigation-survey (“an astonishing 97% of respondents responded that the system is ‘too
expensive,’ with 78% expressing strong agreement.”); AM. BAR ASS’N, ABA SECTION OF
LITIGATION MEMBER SURVEY ON CIVIL PRACTICE: DETAILED REPORT 2–3 (2009), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/american-bar-association-litigation-section-mem
ber-survey-2009 (“82% agree that discovery is too expensive, but within that group only
61% of plaintiffs’ lawyers think it so.”); AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE
FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (2009), available
at http://www.actl.com/AM/Template.cfm?template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=
4008.
59
LAWYERS FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM GRP. & U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR
LEGAL REFORM, LITIGATION COST SURVEY OF MAJOR COMPANIES 2 (2010), available
at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/document/lawyers-civil-justice-et-al-survey-litigation-costs
-major-companies-2010.
60
See Paul W. Grimm & David S. Yellin, A Pragmatic Approach to Discovery Reform:
How Small Changes Can Make A Big Difference in Civil Discovery, 64 S.C. L. REV. 495
(2013).
61
Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 769–70. (stating that categories of cases that did not
generally involve discovery were excluded from the study).
62
REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3.
63
FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 2; Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 770.
64
FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 2.
65
Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 779–80.
66
FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 38–39 tbls.6 & 7.
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The empirical studies of discovery costs . . . indicate that in the typical
case—and perhaps even in the typical major case, although that data is very limited—one should expect discovery costs to account for more than 20 percent, on
the lower end, and maybe, on the higher end, about half of the total litigation
costs. . . . 20 to 50 percent is what we would expect in a typical case.67

Survey respondents were also asked to define a normative ratio of discovery
costs to total litigation costs.68 Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ median response was 33
percent and defense attorneys’ median response was 40 percent.69 A comparison of the closed case ratios to these normative ratios showed that discovery
costs were not excessive as the median cost ratio in the closed cases was less
than the median normative ratio.70 Attorney views on proportionality were also
evaluated. Participants were asked to rate from one to seven how proportional
the discovery in the case was to the client’s stakes.71 A rating of seven was designated as being too excessive, four was just right, and one was too little.72
More than half of both plaintiff and defendant attorneys gave values of four.73
Approximately 27 percent of attorneys gave values of five, six, or seven, 15
percent of attorneys surveyed responded with values of six or seven, and only
approximately 6 percent responded with seven.74 Thus, attorneys viewed discovery as highly disproportionate in only about 6–15 percent of cases.75
In its letter to the Chief Justice following the conference, the Advisory
Committee agreed that “the cases raising concerns are a relatively small percentage of those filed in the federal courts.”76 However, the Committee drew
attention to the costs of the top 5 percent of cases and noted that the cases falling into this top percentile “tend to be the ones that are more complicated and
difficult, in which the stakes for the parties, financial or otherwise, are large.”77
It emphasized that “[i]t would be a mistake to equate the relatively small percentage of such cases with a lack of importance.”78
67

Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 781.
FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 40.
69
Id.
70
Id.; Reda, supra note 2, at 1106. These values were consistent with three decades of previously conducted empirical research. See Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 780 (describing
1960s Columbia project study, 1970s Civil Litigation Research Project, and 1990s RAND
Corporation study showing discovery expense ratios between 20 and 50 percent).
71
FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 28 fig.14.
72
Id.
73
Id. (58.8 percent and 56.8 percent respectively).
74
Id.; see also Alexander Dimitrief et al., Update on the Federal Rules Advisory Committee,
7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 211, 217 (2010).
75
FJC REPORT, supra note 56, at 28 fig.14.
76
REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3.
77
Id. (“In the top 5% of this sample, however, the reported costs were much higher [than the
median values]. The most expensive cases were those in which both the plaintiff and the defendant requested discovery of electronic information; the 95th percentile was $850,000 for
plaintiffs and $991,900 for defendants.”).
78
Id.
68
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In the wake of the Duke Conference, subcommittees were formed. One
subcommittee was formed under the direction of Judge Koeltl to “carry through
the impetus for further work developed at the Duke Conference.”79 Three main
goals that derived from the Duke Conference became the focus of the subcommittee: “[p]roportionality in discovery, cooperation among lawyers, and early
and active judicial case management.”80 Over the next three years, the subcommittee began the process of crafting rules to meet these goals. It solicited
additional studies from the FJC and held a mini-conference in October 2012 to
obtain additional comments from select members of the legal community.81
The standing committee ultimately made a number of rule amendments available for public comment.
This article focuses on the main “proportionality” amendment, which is the
proposed change to rule 26(b)(1). The Rule currently reads:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party’s claim or defense—including the existence, description, nature,
custody, condition, and location of any documents or other tangible things and
the identity and location of persons who know of any discoverable matter. For
good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to the subject
matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the
trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule
26(b)(2)(C).82

Several changes are proposed. The major change is the movement of a version
of the proportionality requirement of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to 26(b)(1). The new
26(b)(1) would read:
Unless otherwise limited by court order, the scope of discovery is as follows:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant
to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case, considering the importance of the issues at stake in the action, the amount in controversy, the parties’ relative access to relevant information, the parties’ resources, the
importance of the discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit. Information
within this scope of discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.83

79

Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 13 (Dec. 6, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/14733/.
80
May 2013 Advisory Committee Report, supra note 4.
81
Agenda, Civil Rules Advisory Committee 77 (Apr. 11–12, 2013) [hereinafter Advisory
Committee Agenda (April 2013)], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15484/.
82
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
83
Agenda, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure 80 (May 29–30, 2014)
[hereinafter
Standing
Committee
Agenda
(May
2014)],
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/file/15343/. This version is different from the previous version of
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II. ATYPICAL CASES MAKE BAD RULES
A. The Atypical Framework
“Atypical” or “oddball” fact patterns have arisen in some recent highprofile and controversial Supreme Court cases.84 In a previous article, one of us
identified such cases and four characteristics common to atypical cases: (1)
atypical facts, (2) a change in the law, (3) the atypical facts motivate the change
in the law, and (4) the legal change affects typical cases.85 The article argued
that when cases meet these characteristics, judges should exercise judicial restraint and avoid making legal change for a variety of reasons.86 This framework can be applied outside of the context of Supreme Court jurisprudence to
the proposed rule changes. Here, we apply this framework to the change to
Rule 26(b)(1) to determine whether restraint should have been exercised.
B. Change in the Rules
The rulemakers contend that no real change to the rules will occur by moving a version of Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) to Rule 26(b)(1). They stated “[t]he proportionality factors to be added to Rule 26(b)(1) are not new.”87 However, if in
effect the proposed rule involved no significant change, it is unlikely that there
would be significant objections. Instead, as already stated, many in the plaintiffs’ and defendants’ bars are divided. Moreover, though difficult to articulate,
the proposed rule significantly changes the rules. Currently under Rule
26(b)(2)(C)(iii), upon motion or on its own, a court can determine whether “the
burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit” using
a number of factors including the needs of the case. This rule comes into play
when a party comes to the court requesting relief from searching or production.
The court then focuses on the burden/expense/benefit of discovery in its decision whether to order such relief. The proposed rule changes the focus to the
determination of the needs of the case from the burden/expense/benefit of discovery, although the significance of this change is unclear. Under the proposed
rule, the most important change is that a party would be affirmatively encourthe proposed rule that was subject to public commentary. Changes were made as a result of
public comments and committee review. See id.
84
See Thomas, supra note 11 (discussing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544
(2007), among other cases).
85
See id.; Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination,
2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 215 (2011); see also Richard A. Bales & Mark B. Gerano, Oddball Arbitration, 30 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 405 (2013) (using Thomas framework in arbitration).
86
Thomas, supra note 11, at 1017–24.
87
Standing Committee Agenda (May 2014), supra note 83, at 67; see Tera E. Brostoff &
Jeffrey D. Koelemay, E-Discovery Rule Gets Late-Night Rewrite, Advisory Committee Approves Rule Package, 82 U.S.L.W. 1549 (Apr. 15, 2014) (at meeting in Portland adopting
proposed rules, Judge Koeltl explained history of proportionality in rules).
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aged to determine what it thinks is proportional to the needs of the case and
then not disclose or search for documents that go beyond that determination.
The party who has requested the search or production must seek an order from
the court. In this discovery process, parties are likely to disagree on what is
proportional to the needs of the case.
C. Atypical Cases Motivate the Change to Rule 26(b)(1)
With median litigation costs of only $15,000 and $20,000 for plaintiffs and
defendants, discovery costs for plaintiffs and defendants as only 20 percent and
27 percent of the total litigation costs, and the widespread belief that costs were
proportional to the stakes in the closed case study, the empirical evidence collected by the FJC indicates that the typical case is not in need of reform.88 That
study’s authors had suggested a cautious reform approach (in 2010), noting the
best course of action may be to avoid “sweeping, radical reforms of pretrial
discovery rules” and instead to “pursue more-focused reforms” of particular
federal rules.89
From its initial report on the Duke Conference to the present day, the Advisory Committee has repeatedly acknowledged that typical cases work well under the current rules. In its report in 2010 to the Chief Justice on the Duke Conference, the Committee described the results of the FJC study:
The results closely parallel the findings of the 1997 closed-case survey the
FJC did for the Advisory Committee . . . . Both FJC studies showed that in many
cases filed in the federal courts, the lawyers handling the cases viewed the discovery as reasonably proportional to the needs of the cases and the Civil Rules
as working well. The FJC studies support the conclusion that the cases raising
concerns are a relatively small percentage of those filed in the federal courts
. . . .90

In describing the typical case, the Committee noted that “[e]mpirical studies
conducted over the course of more than forty years have shown that the discovery rules work well in most cases.”91 The Advisory Committee report in April
2013 also acknowledges that discovery is working fine for most cases.
In most cases discovery now, as it was then [at the time of the 1983 Rule 26
amendments], is accomplished in reasonable proportion to the realistic needs of
the case. This conclusion has been established by repeated empirical studies, including the large-scale closed-case study done by the Federal Judicial Center for
the Duke Conference.92

88

See supra notes 61–75 and accompanying text.
Lee & Willging, supra note 32, at 787.
90
REPORT TO CHIEF JUSTICE, supra note 1, at 3.
91
Id. at 7.
92
Advisory Committee Agenda (April 2013), supra note 81, at 83. This language was deleted prior to official publication of the proposed rules. The committee explained its deletion:
89

Is there any need for this defense, which seems directed more at anticipated academic reactions
than anything else? “The more you say, the more you invite.” These sentences were described as
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Similar to the Advisory Committee that proposed the 2000 discovery
amendments, the current Advisory Committee has recommended a broad
change despite the recognition that discovery works in typical cases. Emphasizing the importance of atypical cases, it stated that “discovery runs out of proportion in a worrisome number of cases, particularly those that are complex,
involve high stakes, and generate particularly contentious adversary behavior.”93 Justifications for the proposed rules rely heavily on attorney belief derived from the conference generally and impressionistic studies that costs are
too high in some cases despite attorney belief derived from the FJC study that
costs in typical cases are proportional. The 2010 Report to the Standing Committee stated:
Had there been any doubt about perceptions of cost and delay, the 2010
Conference participants and papers dispelled it. To be sure, the Federal Judicial
Center closed-case study showed that most lawyers, in most cases, believe that
the cost of civil litigation in the federal courts is fairly proportioned to their cases. But particularly for cases involving high stakes, multiple parties, and overzealous advocates, there is widespread agreement that litigation is too often too
costly.94

Moreover, the final May 2014 Advisory Committee Report to the Standing
Committee similarly stated:
A principal conclusion of the Duke conference was that discovery in civil
litigation would more often achieve the goal of Rule 1—the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action—through an increased emphasis on
proportionality. This conclusion was expressed often by speakers and panels at
the conference and was supported by a number of surveys done in preparation
for the conference. . . .
....
Although the FJC study found that a majority of lawyers thought that the
discovery in a specific case they handled generated the “right amount” of information, and more than half reported that the costs of discovery were the “right
amount” in proportion to their client’s stakes in the closed cases, a quarter of attorneys viewed discovery costs in their cases as too high relative to their clients’
stakes in the case. . . .
Other surveys prepared for the Duke conference showed even greater dissatisfaction with the costs and extent of civil discovery.95
an editorial, or as vigorous advocacy, more than something appropriate for the Note. The Subcommittee agreed to delete them.

Id. at 112.
93
Id. at 83.
94
Memorandum from Hon. Mark R. Kravitz, Chair, Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, to Hon. Lee H. Rosenthal, Chair, Standing Comm. on Rules of Practice and
Procedure 7 (May 17, 2010), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/14694/; see also
Grimm & Yellin, supra note 60; Koeltl, supra note 55. The Grimm & Yellin paper draws
extensively on the impressionistic surveys presented at the conference. Neither the 2008 FJC
report, nor any of the previously conducted empirical data refuting the high cost myth are
mentioned in the paper. Grimm & Yellin, supra note 60.
95
Standing Committee Agenda (May 2014), supra note 83, at 65–66.
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In the past, some have pointed out the possible influence on rulemaking
from those representing corporations in complex cases. After the 2000
Amendment of Rule 26(b)(1), Professor Stempel discussed particular influences. He stated: “the empirical data available to the Rulemakers neither suggests nor supports Proposed Amended Rule 26(b)(1). The Advisory Committee
appears to have determined to fight an unnecessary battle largely because of the
political preferences of the leadership of the American College of Trial Lawyers and the ABA Litigation Section.”96 Professor Stempel’s analysis of the
Committee makeup indicated that the Committee consisted primarily of members with certain characteristics, including complex litigation experience.97 He
concluded that “the Advisory Committee vote on scope of discovery, despite a
debate of considerable sophistication, in the end resembled Capitol Hill as
much as a judicial deliberation.”98
In the case of the proposed Rule 26(b)(1) amendments, similar influence
can be seen from the earliest stages of the reform process. Consider the previously discussed 2008 ACTL-IAALS survey cited by the Committee, Judge Koeltl, and Judge Grimm as one of the motivators for the current rule reform.99
Membership in ACTL is “extended by invitation only, after careful investigation, to those experienced trial lawyers who have mastered the art of advocacy.”100 Lawyers must have a minimum fifteen years’ experience to be eligible
to join the college, and membership cannot exceed one percent of the total lawyer population in a state or province.101 The survey respondents from ACTL
had practiced law for an average of thirty-eight years, approximately threefourths of the respondents primarily represented defendants,102 and “[a]bout 40
percent of the respondents litigate[d] complex commercial disputes.”103
Additionally, when evaluating proposed rules, committee members likely
draw on their own experience with the litigation system. Confirmation bias—
increased receptiveness to evidence that confirms what one already believes—
affects every player in the rulemaking process and may, in part, explain why so
96

Stempel, supra note 10, at 580–81; see also Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Federal Court Rulemaking and Litigation Reform: An Institutional Approach 15 NEV. L.J. 1559,
1588 (2015) (“In explaining the change in the Committee’s position, Judge Niemeyer invoked persistent pressure for litigation retrenchment from elite elements of the bar and a report from President Bush’s Council on Competitiveness issued back in 1991.”).
97
Stempel, supra note 10, at 614–23; cf. A Self-Study of Federal Judicial Rulemaking: A
Report From the Subcommittee on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D.
679, 696 (1995); Peter G. McCabe, Renewal of the Federal Rulemaking Process, 44 AM. U.
L. REV. 1655, 1666 (1995).
98
Stempel, supra note 10, at 618.
99
Koeltl, supra note 55. As previously noted, the ACTL has lobbied the Committee to narrow the scope of discovery for many years. See Stempel, supra note 10, at 557.
100
ACTL & IAALS, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 54.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 2.
103
Id.
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many rulemakers and attorneys believe that litigation costs are out of control
despite empirical evidence to the contrary.104 The current Advisory Committee
includes many individuals who, similar to the members of ACTL, have complex litigation experience. All four practitioners (Elizabeth Cabraser, Peter
Keisler, Parker Folse III, and John Barkett), as well as the academic (Dean
Klonoff), list extensive complex litigation experience on their respective profile
pages.105 Moreover, many of the federal judges have similar past experiences.106 For many on the Committee, the “typical” litigation experience appears to
be the atypical case. Additionally, research shows the limited ability of humans
to consider all the facts, circumstances, and implications of a problem. Instead,
they inordinately focus on what is before them.107 So, the rulemakers may be
able to see only the problem presented to them—that is, high costs and delays
in discovery, thus motivating the rule change.
104

Reda, supra note 2, at 1119.
John M. Barkett, SHOOK, HARDY & BACON L.L.P., http://www.shb.com/professionals
/b/barkett-john (last visited June 22, 2015) (“Mr. Barkett has, over the years, been a commercial litigator (contract and corporate disputes, employment, trademark and antitrust), environmental litigator (Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery Act and toxic tort), and, for the past several years,
a peacemaker and problem solver, serving as an arbitrator, mediator, facilitator, or allocator
in a variety of environmental, commercial, or reinsurance contexts.”); Elizabeth J. Cabraser,
LIEFF CABRASER HEIMANN & BERNSTEIN, http://www.lieffcabraser.com/Attorneys/Elizabeth
-J-Cabraser.shtml (last visited June 22, 2015)(“ Possessing unparalleled expertise in complex
civil litigation, Elizabeth has served as court-appointed lead, co-lead, or class counsel in
scores of federal multi-district and state coordinated proceedings.”); Parker C. Folse,
SUSMAN GODFREY L.L.P., http://www.susmangodfrey.com/Attorneys/Parker-C-Folse/ (last
visited June 22, 2015)(“He represents both plaintiffs and defendants in a wide variety of
complex commercial litigation matters, including contract disputes, antitrust litigation, patent
infringement cases, and audit malpractice suits. Mr. Folse has been a fellow of the American
College of Trial Lawyers since 2012 and has extensive experience in difficult, complex
commercial cases.”); Peter D. Keisler, SIDLEY AUSTIN LLP, http://www.sidley.com/en
/people/peter-keisler, (last visited June 22, 2015)(“[Keisler] has successfully represented
some of the country’s largest companies in the telecommunications, transportation, energy
and healthcare industries, as well as a host of national trade associations . . . . His practice
representing clients before the United States Supreme Court, federal courts of appeals and
federal district courts has included the leading role in the nation’s most important energy
lawsuits of the past several years . . . .”); Law Faculty: Robert Klonoff, LEWIS &
CLARK L. SCH., http://law.lclark.edu/live/profiles/310-robert-klonoff/ (last visited June 22,
2015)(“[Professor Klonoff’s] areas of expertise include class action litigation, civil procedure, and appellate litigation. . . . At Jones Day, Professor Klonoff handled complex litigation at both the trial and appellate levels and also held the administrative post of chair of the
pro bono program for all of the firm’s 20+ offices.”).
106
Duke Subcommittee chair John Koeltl worked at Debevoise & Plimpton for
nearly twenty years. Biography for Hon. John G. Koeltl, AM. B.
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials
ASS’N,
/2015-sac/koeltl_john.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited June 22, 2015). Duke Subcommittee
member Paul Grimm was a lawyer with Jordan Coyne Savits & Lopata and Niles, Barton &
Wilmer for several years. 138 CONG. REC. S7334 (daily ed. Dec. 3, 2012) (statement of Sen.
Chuck Grassley).
107
See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2012).
105
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D. The Change in the Rule Will Affect Typical Cases
So, we have showed a change in the rules and that the change in the rules is
motivated by atypical cases. The final characteristic of the atypical framework
is that the proposed rules will affect typical cases. Although only atypical cases
motivate the proposed proportionality amendments, the amendments also apply
to typical cases. The result may be an increase in cost and delay in typical, already proportional cases. Under the new rule, a party can choose not to search
or produce documents that they deem not “proportional to the needs of the
case.”108 If the party does not search and/or produce such documents, the requesting party may move to compel the documents, which will result in more
costs to the parties in motion practice as well as costs to the court in managing
discovery, in addition to more delay.109 Also, plaintiffs in certain typical cases—for example, employment discrimination cases—may be affected more
than others. If discovery is not searched and/or produced in such cases in which
summary judgment motions often are made, plaintiffs may have even more difficulty defeating summary judgment motions with less discovery. Consequently, certain laws like the employment discrimination laws may enjoy less enforcement.
E. The Cost of Proposed Rule 26(b)(1)
Under the atypical framework, change should not be made when atypical
cases motivate legal change that affects typical cases because of the cost of
such change. One cost of atypical rule amendments is a loss of legitimacy for
rulemakers and the rulemaking process.110 Rulemakers can lose legitimacy
when they appear to reject empirical evidence or appear to follow the wishes of
special interest groups.111 At the same time, certain classes of litigants may be
placed at a disadvantage under the new rules, creating perceived unfairness in
the litigation system.112
A second cost of atypical rule amendments also arises from the application
of the amendment to typical cases.113 Judges may have difficulty understanding
how to apply the new rule to typical cases given these cases do not drive the
rule amendment.114 This in turn leads to disjointed case law and inconsistent
precedent, increasing costs throughout the judicial system.115
108

Standing Committee Agenda (May 2014), supra note 83.
See, e.g., National Employment Lawyers Association, Comments on Proposed Changes
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Under Consideration by the Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules (Mar. 1, 2013) (on file with authors).
110
See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1020.
111
See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 47–48.
112
Tobias, supra note 44.
113
See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1021.
114
Id.
115
See, e.g., Tobias, supra note 44.
109
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Learning costs for legal professionals occur with any rule change but when
atypical cases motivate reform, lawyers and judges with more typical experience may face higher learning costs for the new rules.116 In this respect, atypical rule amendments create high public transition costs as many legal professionals have typical experience and will lack familiarity with the reasons
behind the new rules.117
Interparty costs are also possible here.118 As already mentioned, the rule
very well will motivate withholding or not searching in situations where such
behavior did not occur previously.119
A final cost is that once atypical rule amendments are passed, they are unlikely to be revised.120 Certain features of the rulemaking process create this
inertia. First, numerous commentators have argued that rule changes should be
made only reluctantly, when there is a substantial need for the change.121 The
Advisory Committee has pursued this approach, which is characterized by constantly monitoring the rules for areas in need of revision but only reluctantly
making changes.122 Even if an advisory committee is willing to reconsider a recently adopted rule amendment, the slow pace of the rulemaking system means
several years may pass before any amendment is revised through the committee
process.123
III. FUTURE RULEMAKING
To prevent atypical rule changes in the future, changes are necessary in a
few areas including committee membership and the rules’ focus. First, the current Advisory Committee is largely dominated by individuals with complex litigation experience.124 Extending Committee membership to include lawyers
with smaller practices and different practice areas will help shift the perspective
of the Committee away from the smaller subset of issues unique to complex
cases and will provide the Committee more perspectives of the litigation system.125 Perhaps Congress and not the Chief Justice should control who sits on
the Advisory Committee. Second, the rulemakers should avoid one-size-fits-all
rule amendments that will affect typical cases when the problem that they seek
116

See Thomas, supra note 11, at 1021.
See id.
118
See id. at 1022.
119
See id.
120
See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
121
See, e.g., John P. Frank, the Rules of Civil Procedure—Agenda for Reform, 137 U. PA. L.
REV. 1883, 1885 (1989) (“The fundamental precept of rulemaking always ought be that no
rule shall be altered unless there is substantial need for the change.”); McCabe, supra note
97, at 1679.
122
McCabe, supra note 97, at 1679.
123
See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
124
See supra Part II.C.
125
Coleman, supra note 7, at 295.
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to address does not lie with typical cases. Since its inception, the Advisory
Committee has assumed that the REA’s reference to “general rules” requires
transsubstantive rulemaking.126 Professor Stephen Subrin has championed
avoiding such transsubstantive rulemaking to address issues unique to limited
sets of cases.127 While transsubstantive rulemaking has a number of important
advantages,128 Professor Subrin and others have noted that it is sometimes a
poor fit for large and complex cases, resulting in unnecessary cost, delay, and
complexity in the legal system.129 To ensure that the same rules are applied to
all cases, rulemakers are forced to draft general rules in response to problems in
specific, usually complex cases.130 Consistent with these ideas that transsubstantive rulemaking should be on its last legs, in his testimony before the Advisory Committee against proposed discovery changes, Professor Arthur Miller
emphasized that the rulemakers should consider special rules for the problematic, complex cases.131

126

See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of “General Rules”, 2009 WIS. L.
REV. 535, 543 (“transsubstantivity has remained a foundational assumption for all subsequent advisory committees.”).
127
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the “One Size Fits All” Assumption, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 377 (2010) [hereinafter Subrin,
Limitations]. In the Limitations article, Professor Subrin defines transsubstantivity as “the
notion that the same procedural rules should be available for all civil law suits: (1) regardless
of the substantive law underlying the claims, or ‘case-type’ transsubstantivity; and (2) regardless of the size of the litigation or the stakes involved, or ‘case-size’ transsubstantivity.”
Id., at 378; see Stephen N. Subrin, Fudge Points and Thin Ice in Discovery Reform and the
Case for Selective Substance-Specific Procedure, 46 FLA. L. REV. 27, 41 (1994); Stephen N.
Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence, and Emerging
Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2038–43 (1989). Other scholars have also
championed this cause. See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for
Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. REV. 319, 333 (2008); Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and
Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
693, 713 n.140 (1988); Robert M. Cover, For James Wm. Moore: Some Reflections on a
Reading of the Rules, 84 YALE L.J. 718 (1975).
128
See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-trans-substantive Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2067 (1989); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-substantive
Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237, 2244 (1989);
Subrin, Limitations, supra note 127, at 387.
129
Subrin, Limitations, supra note 127, at 388–91.
130
Stephen B. Burbank, The Roles of Litigation, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 705, 711 (2002) (“The
misguided approach to procedural reform that treats all litigation as if it were complex litigation can at least be explained, if not justified, by the quest for uniform and transsubstantive
regulation that has preoccupied modern American procedural policy.”); Subrin, Limitations,
supra note 127, at 388–91. These rules are often drafted to give a great deal of discretion to
judges and lawyers to accommodate the large range of potential cases that they may trigger.
Id. Discretion creates greater precedential uncertainty as different judges are empowered by
the rules to treat similar cases differently, increasing the monetary and justice costs of the
litigation system as a whole. Id.
131
Transcript of Testimony of Arthur Miller Before Advisory Committee (Jan. 9, 2014),
36–45, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/file/9446/.
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CONCLUSION
This article suggests that rulemakers should avoid rule amendments that
are motivated by atypical cases and will affect typical cases. When atypical rule
amendments are passed, high systemic costs arise. The proposed proportionality amendment provides a useful example of how atypical cases can motivate
reform efforts and how atypical rule amendments may negatively affect typical
cases. Future changes such as broadening committee membership and a willingness to adopt non-transsubstantive rules can eliminate the problem of such
atypical rules.
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